Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER — PROUDHON

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"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."

JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

Lack of space compels me to defer till a later issue my comments on Mr. Bilgram's communication on another page.

The New York "Sun" of a recent morning opposed editorially the proposed law making architecture a monopoly, and in the evening it editorially favored it. Sunrise and Sunset fairly represents the difference between these two attitudes.

It is all well enough for newspaper reporters to be pious. But they should not let it lead them into absurdities, as they did when they joined in singing "Nearer, my God, to Thee" on hearing that "La Gascogne" was safe. The joy we all felt was occasioned by the fact that we could sing truthfully "Farther, my God, from Thee."

Very naturally the New York "Sun" opposes the acceptance by the city of a statue of Heinrich Heine. The pretence is that statues should be placed only in cities with which the men whom they represent were intimately connected. But of course the real reason is that Heine was not a member of the brotherhood of thieves. Dana, however, is willing to make an exception of those commanding geniuses whom the whole world may fitly honor. Why, certainly; it would never do to shut out Bismarck. He belongs to the brotherhood.

Judge Pryor, of this city, whose own domestic life is presumably happy, although his favorable view of woman suffrage is not shared by Mrs. Pryor, deprecates the tendency toward an increase in the number of divorces. He thinks it may yet be necessary to amend the marriage service so that it will read "husband and wife until death or divorce do us part." It is hard to see what the number of divorces has to do with the propriety of the change suggested, which was in reality tacitly made when the principle of divorce was first admitted. However, Liberty votes for the amendment. It would serve to make the marriage service ridiculous.

Mr. Beerbohm Tree and his company are definitively billed to appear in Ibsen's "An Enemy of the People" at Abbey's Theatre on Monday evening, April 8. No Anarchist who has it in his power to witness this performance should fail to improve the rare opportunity. Other encouraging signs of progress are to be noted in the facts that Richard Mansfield has taken a lease of a New York theatre, with Janet Achurch, well known in London as an interpreter of Ibsen *rôles*, as a member of his company; and that in Boston "The Pillars of Society," "The Lady of the Sea," and "Little Eyolf" are to be produced in April, Mrs. Erving Winslow taking the initiative.

Dana naturally applauds the action of the Chicago University in dismissing an instructor, and threatening a professor with dismissal, for advocating Populist theories on the platform. Professors, says Dana, "must be above suspicion." He does not say of what, but he clearly means of disloyalty to the brotherhood of thieves. Chicago University is subsidized by monopolists, and it is absurd to suppose that these will pay men for exposing the evils of plutocracy. How sad it must be to the monopolists that, after all, there are very few men who are as aggressively loyal to them, as absolutely "above suspicion," as Dana is!

They have organized in France a "Comité de Défense et de Progrès Social" for the purpose of stemming the tide of State Socialism. The founders are progressive people evidently, and mean well. They propose to vindicate the real excellences of the present order, while welcoming all rational suggestion of reform in directions needing it. They are not blind partisan defenders of the *status quo*, but they will adopt nothing which is not a real improvement upon it. All this is very fine, but such leagues and committees are doomed to impotence and disappointment for the reason that they have nothing substantial and positive to offer to the world crying for radical change. Vague sympathy with reform will not do, and abstract admission that all is not for the best in this world is equally unsatisfactory. To combat State Socialism a great deal more is necessary. It is necessary to be able to point out what is wrong, and what the ways are of righting it. It is also necessary to be scientific and correct in one's diagnosis and therapeutics. Of nothing else is State Socialism afraid.

Discussing the financial proposals of the bankers, Matthew Marshall writes in the "Sun": "It is hardly to be supposed that any proposition for abolishing the independent treasury and transferring the fiscal business of the government to a great national bank, like those of Great Britain, France, and Germany, would be favorably entertained by our people. The same hostility to the money power which sustained President Jackson in his contest with the old United States Bank still survives with sufficient vigor to prevent the creation of a new one. Nor, on the other hand, will our people ever consent to surrender to a multitude little banks, national or State, the monopoly of the lucrative business of manufacturing money out of credit." This is doubtless true; but it is not necessary that the business should be a monopoly and particularly lucrative. If the people once perceived that *free* banking — the surrender of the business to a "multitude" of little banks, or to whomsoever might choose to go into it, leaving the task of sifting out the safe from the wildcat to the people themselves — would give them cheaper and better service than they have under the present mongrel system, which is a rare combination of the disadvantages of *all* systems, they would speedily conquer their prejudices against letting any and everybody manufacture money out of credit. What better protection can rational people want than that afforded by a plan which places the remedy for abuses of every sort in their own hands?

Our friends, the conservatives, ought to "come together" and see if they cannot present a more solid and united front to the enemy. As it is, they are affording said enemy lots of amusement. Note the lack of harmony in their treatment of Ibsen's new play. The verdict of the London "Times"—"dreary deserts of childish and pointless dialogue"—might carry weight, if the readers did not find in an equally orthodox and respectable journal, the "Westminster Gazette," a countervailing opinion to the effect that "Ibsen has never written a more interesting or a more intense and characteristic play." The puzzled reader turns to another pillar of orthodoxy, the London "Daily News," and he wonders at the aberration of the "Westminster Gazette." How can it praise a play which the "News" condemns on the ground that "the personages are mere abstractions, the dialogue is diffuse and pointless, and the story lacks the well-defined datum without which few plays have ever achieved success"? Beginning to suspect a lapse on the part of the "Gazette," he nevertheless decides to make assurance doubly sure by consulting a fourth authority, the "St. James Gazette." This stanch organ of literary and dramatic Toryism will certainly settle the question for him. Imagine his amazement when he reads that the play is "a miracle of dramatic construction," and that the dialogue is so "masterly" that "there is not a cut which would not break the organism of the play"! More perplexed than before, the light-seeking Briton concludes that Ibsen has invaded the very citadel of orthodoxy, and that there is no longer any safety anywhere. In which conclusion he is unquestionably right.

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"*In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel.*" — PROUDHON.

☞ The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

Moralism the Denial of Love.

Mr. Byington, in his letter in this issue, declines to accept Kant as a typical Moralist. I did not offer him as such; I offered him simply as a logical Moralist. Most of the Moralists are less logical than he, and therefore he does not typify them. He carries consciously and clearly to its ultimate the doctrine that fills the ordinary Moralistic mind in a more or less nebulous fashion, — namely, that denial of self is the essence of goodness. Kant reduces this doctrine to absurdity, and accepts the absurdity. Jesus Christ and Mr. Byington are not as bold as he. But in their doctrine lurks the virus just the same. They have a saving remnant of good sense which keeps them from declaring that he only is a good man who does good things against the inclinations of his nature. But even they subordinate the natural inclinations to the "fulfilment of the [moral] law."

The Egoist admires the nun in "Les Misérables" who loves to tell the truth, but who, in a grave emergency, rises above her religion which makes it her "duty" to tell the truth, and deliberately lies to save an unfortunate from injustice and cruelty, because she loves her neighbor though in doing so she violates the [moral] law, — loves him more than formal truth. But the strict Moralist must condemn this nun. He cannot admire her unless in such a case she tells the truth, fulfils the law, and stifles her love of neighbor. Christ's statement that love of neighbor is fulfilment of the law is an absurdity as long as he gives priority to a law to which conduct should conform in every case, though such conduct be an injury to neighbor.

In fact, the whole doctrine of love of neighbor as a "commandment" is the utter denial of inclination and a perversion of the word "love." Commanded love of all men indiscriminately is an obliteration of distinction between love and hate, and therefore is not love at all. It is a stifling of all natural attraction to that which is lovable and of all natural repugnance to that which is hateful, — a rigid, formal, heartless, soulless, and sort of unconsciously hypocritical joining of hands. Of course there are many Moralists, like Hugo's nun, who feel the honest loves and hates of normal human beings, and who therefore rise at times above Christ's teaching. They are then false to their own doctrine, because they then act upon their natural inclination, whereas it is the essence of their doctrine that they should subordinate their inclination.

My Egoism differs in no wise from that of Badcock and Stirner. I am just as much averse to praise and blame as Badcock is; and, if I use the vocabulary of praise and blame, it is because I know no other by which to express my likes and dislikes. Badcock is in the same difficulty. In his "Slaves to Duty," only twenty lines beyond the sentence which Mr. Byington quotes therefrom, Badcock declares that he "admires the natural mother," and the context implies the opposite of admiration for the unnatural mother. Evidently, then, to him as to myself, there are superior and inferior beings. We do not give credit to the former for their goodness, or debit to the latter for their badness; but the difference between them we recognize and declare, in doing which I generally use stronger adjectives than those which Badcock employs. And Stirner's attitude is the same in this respect. Indeed, one of the chapters of his book is devoted to the tracing of man's development from an inferior to a superior position. When he says that men are neither good or bad, he means simply that it is a mistake to divide human beings into two classes, one of which crucifies self and the other of which satisfies self. He believes that all persons are alike in endeavoring to satisfy self, and his objection is to those people who foster a delusion that they are crucifying themselves, and who plume themselves on this purely fanciful distinction between their class and the rest of mankind. His object is to bring all men to a realization of the truth that no man, to use Walt Whitman's phrase, knows any flesh sweeter than that which sticks to his own bones, hoping that, when they realize this, they will no longer submit to the slavery which exploiters succeed in imposing upon them by inculcation of self-sacrifice. Stirner, Badcock, and I speak of good and bad men as we speak of good and bad wine, or as Mr. Byington, to whom all wine is bad, speaks of good and bad water; but we do not attribute immorality to bad men any more than to bad wine or bad water. It is in this that we differ from the Moralist.

T.

The Bench's Dangerous Power.

So far as the federal supreme court is concerned, it would seem that the problem before it in the income-tax case is very simple indeed. A little logic, coupled with knowledge of the conditions which surrounded the framers of the constitution, is all that can be needed for the determination of the question what the terms "direct tax" and "uniformity," used in the constitution, mean. Yet the able lawyers who argued the case, instead of keeping within the clearly-defined limits of the legal controversy, went out of their way to discuss broad questions of justice, expediency, and wisdom, — questions with which the court has theoretically no right to concern itself. This curious proceeding was allowed to pass without a word of comment, although there were loud protests and deep curses in connection with the threats of Mr. Olney and Mr. Carter that a nullification of the income-tax law might lead to revolutionary assaults on the entire social system. It was considered proper for ex-Senator Edmunds and Mr. Choate to attack the alleged Populistic and Communistic grounds of congress in passing the law, but outrageous for the attorney-general to refer to the public clamor for anti-plutocratic legislation! The fact is that the court, in deciding the case, will be guided by general political and practical considerations rather than by principles of legal construction, and this shows the great importance of the power of interpreting and construing legislation. The real legislators are the judges, for a law is nothing until it is construed by the courts. And since the courts are influenced by the humors of the time and by their own private notions of justice and expediency, it is plain that there is nothing left of the ancient notion that courts pass upon the law in exactly the same sense in which juries are allowed to pass upon facts, — namely, to find just what they are. The courts in reality judge of the equity and wisdom of the law, and have the power of vetoing such as do not commend themselves to their feelings. This being the case, it is easy to see that this power ought to be taken from them and given to the jury, the representatives of the entire community. In them alone should be lodged the power of vetoing legislation.

V. Y.

Equal Freedom and Land.

In view of Mr. Tucker's comments on my indictment of Spencer, further discussion of land tenure under equal freedom seems to be necessary. The assertion that my acceptance of Spencerian ethics must logically land me in the camp of the Single Taxers or land nationalizationists requires examination. A *prima facie* case in support of such a contention can be made out by showing that Spencer himself, where he attempts to determine, in the abstract, what tenure is consonant with equal freedom, arrives at the solution of the land-nationalizationists. Is the conclusion inevitable?

Before proceeding to answer this question, I may point out that an inconsistency seems to be lurking between Mr. Tucker's defence of his own position and his criticism of mine. He tells us that, while he would not hesitate to deviate from equal freedom in cases of necessity, on the land question he finds himself confronted by no such necessity, and that occupancy-and-use is strictly consonant with equal freedom as interpreted by him. At the same time he accuses me of unsoundness because I believe in the "law" of equal freedom *and* in occupancy and use. Now, whether I am right or wrong in regarding equal freedom as a *law*, I fail to see why it is any more inconsistent for *me* to accept occupancy-and-use than it is for Mr. Tucker, who looks upon equal freedom as a safe and generally trustworthy guiding principle rather than as a law. Be it this or that, the important point is that, according to Mr. Tucker's own statement, occupancy-and-use is entirely consonant with it. By rejecting, and not by accepting, occupancy-and-use would I expose myself to the charge of unsoundness.

But, Mr. Tucker may protest, "it is not your acceptance of equal freedom that I warn you against; it is your belief in Spencer's absolute ethics, from which the corollary is logically drawn that all men have an equal right to land." I rejoin, in the first place, that by "absolute ethics" nothing more is meant than the viewing of equal freedom as a *law*, — as something to which there are no exceptions and which can never be disregarded except on pain of social discord and suffering, and, in the second place, that the Spencerian deduction of communistic land ownership is *not* a logically drawn corollary from equal freedom. In my article, intended to bring out Spencer's contradictions and question-begging, I did not stop to dispute his conclusion with regard to the equitable system of land tenure under equal freedom, but, as a matter of fact, I do question the correctness of his reasoning on this head. I deny that equality in the use of the earth is a corollary from the law of equal freedom. I fully agree with Mr. Tucker that equal freedom does not necessarily imply equal right to land in the Spencerian or single-tax sense of equal use by all men of the entire earth. The sense in which I use the formula equal right to land is not repugnant to occupancy-and-use.

The statement that equal freedom implies the equal right to land is not sufficiently definite and precise. What is to be understood by "equal right to land"? The land-nationalizationists assume that their system secures the equality enjoined by equal freedom; the Single-Taxers are satisfied that private ownership qualified by taxation of land values fully meets the requirements; while I maintain (with Mr. Tucker, if I understand him) that occupancy-and-use meets the demand in the best possible manner. Which of us is right and true to equal freedom? I maintain — and it seems to me to be manifestly true — that the law (or principle, if you prefer) of equal freedom does not *directly* point to *any* system of land tenure. This will be readily seen from a closer examination of Mr. Tucker's formula, which is, I claim, unexceptionable. "Equal freedom to control self and the results of self-exertion." If we could obtain "results" without using land, nothing would be in the way. The trouble is that no exertion is possible without using something that is *not* the result of self-exertion. So that to lay down the rule that we are entitled to the control of self and the results of self-exertion in no wise helps us to determine the extent of our proper claims to that which is not ours, but which we must have in order to exert ourselves at all. In short, equal liberty does not directly throw any light on the question of the use of the earth. It does, however, indirectly, and I base my advocacy of occupancy-and-use on this indirect illumination.

Let us ask ourselves what the object is which equal liberty is to further and promote. We insist on the freedom to control self and the results of self-exertion; but for what purpose? To secure the maximum of happiness, the fullest possible exercise of faculties, by each individual. Now, what system of land tenure is best fitted and calculated to aid in securing this result? From all the evidence thus far gathered, I conclude that occupancy-and-use answers the purpose most completely and effectually. I am free to admit that the taxation of economic rent for general public ends, *if voluntarily agreed to*, would be a more perfect arrangement in some respects, but the use of force to bring it about would be extremely unwise, since the evil generated by it would more than counterbalance the benefits of the equalization of the incomes from the soil. Under occupancy-and-use there would be some inequality, but such inequality would not negative the fullest and freest exercise by each of his faculties. There is inequality in the enjoyment of the sun's light and heat, yet nobody supposes that this can be remedied.

I agree, therefore, with Mr. Tucker that ultimately each will contract (tacitly, however, not formally) not to encroach upon any portion of the earth which another is actually using, and they will do so because they will find this arrangement more conducive to the highest liberty and happiness than any other.

If Mr. Tucker thinks that this position is inconsistent with absolute ethics, with the belief in the existence of a *law* of equal freedom, he will have to reverse his own declaration that occupancy-and-use is entirely consistent with equal freedom.

I have just stated that Spencer's absolute ethics, the viewing of equal freedom as a *law*, does not necessarily lead to the dogma of the equal right of each to the land. Since Spencer is opposed to this affirmation, it is incumbent on me to refute his reasoning on this point. In "A Perplexed Philosopher" Henry George has drawn attention to Spencer's confusion of *equal* rights with *joint* rights. Throughout Spencer assumes that equity demands the recognition of men's joint right to the land, but the assumption is unwarranted. All that his arguments prove is the necessity of recognizing equality in the right to use the earth. Occupancy-and-use recognizes the only equality possible in the premises. Turning to the chapter on land in "Social Statics" (first edition), we read:

> Given a race of beings having like claims to pursue the objects of their desires; given a world adapted to the gratification of these desires; a world into which such beings are similarly born, — and it unavoidably follows that they have equal rights to the use of this world. For, if each of them "has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other," then each of them is free to use the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, provided he allows all others the same liberty. And, conversely, it is manifest that no one, or part, of them may use the earth in such a way as to prevent the rest from similarly using it; seeing that to do this is to assume greater freedom than the rest, and consequently to break the law.

So far, excellent. It is an admirable argument against monopoly, but not against occupancy-and-use, under which each simply uses the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, and denies no one the *same liberty*, — the liberty to use another portion of the earth for the satisfaction of *his* wants. But Spencer continues:

> Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land.

"Therefore"! Why, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in the above to warrant any such conclusion! All we are warranted in inferring is that equity does not permit *some* to appropriate the land to the exclusion of others. So long as each only uses land to satisfy his wants, and prevents no one from doing the same, he does not claim greater freedom than the rest. The conclusion does not follow from the premises; it is fallaciously drawn. To make this still clearer, I quote further:

> For, if *one* portion of the earth's surface may justly become the possession of an individual, and may be held by him for his sole use and benefit, as a thing to which he has an exclusive right, then *other* portions of the earth's surface may be so held; and eventually the *whole* of the earth's surface may be so held; and our planet may thus lapse altogether into private hands.

Yes, the planet *may* lapse into private hands, but not into the hands of a few. Each will have enough land to satisfy his wants, and none more than that. There will be no "lords of the soil" on one hand, and landless men on the other. Each will be a lord of a very small piece of soil. It is certainly true that, if one portion of the soil may be held as private property, other portions of the soil may be so held, *but not by the same individual.* The reason for his owning one portion fails when he attempts to annex or enclose other portions. It is this which, strangely enough, Spencer overlooked. His argument is vitiated by an astonishing fallacy.

I repeat that occupancy-and-use seems to me to subserve the end to which equal freedom is the means and condition more fully and completely than any other system, and there is no reason whatever why a believer in equal freedom should prefer another.

A word on the question of the propriety of speaking of equal freedom as a law. I can see no ground for the distinction attempted to be drawn by Mr. Tucker. True, if he were successful in proving that it is sometimes expedient to disregard equal freedom, my claim that equal freedom is a social law, in the strictly scientific sense in which we describe other observed uniformities as laws, would be disposed of, for a law never can be violated. But no such success is possible; it cannot be shown that it is ever expedient or necessary to go counter to equal freedom. Mr. Tucker's illustration is not in any sense a case of violation of equal freedom. The Anarchist does not become an Archist by killing the non-invasive men who are made to play the part of aggressors against their will. An invader is one who invades, whose *acts* are invasive, and the question of his intention is only material when we try him leisurely by a jury and wish to determine the precise degree of his guilt. Doubtless an Anarchistic jury would not punish as severely, if at all, a man who was shown to have been forced to commit invasive acts as it would an intentional and willing invader. But, when we are resisting an army and have to protect ourselves against actual, direct danger, all those are invaders who are about to do invasive acts. *Why* this or that individual member of the invading army confronts us as an enemy is entirely irrelevant. He *is* an enemy, he is about to attack us; and we are entitled to defend ourselves. He is first in committing aggression; instead of refusing to join the army and suffering the consequences of his disobedience, he tries to save himself by endangering *our* rights. Under such circumstances equal freedom imposes no restriction whatever on our action toward him. In coercing him we coerce an individual who, though friendly to us in his heart, would rather act as an enemy than expose himself to punishment for disobedience.

Equal freedom, says Mr. Tucker, is an expedient which we agree to adopt in consequence of the discovery that it is the only means by which men can steadily avail themselves of the highest advantages of life. My way of putting it is this: Equal freedom is a rule of conduct which we are learning to observe in consequence of the discovery that it is the first and essential condition of social stability and happiness. And because it *is* such a condition, because it *must* be fulfilled and *cannot* be violated with impunity, we may call it, in scientific language, the *law* of social life. V. Y.

The Two Conceptions of Equal Freedom.

It may be well to state that the foregoing article appears in the editorial column because Mr. Yarros thinks that it may legitimately so appear, being an attempt to show consistency between two ideas which Liberty champions, — *viz.*, equal freedom, and occupancy-and-use as the rule of land tenure. If we do not go back of words to things, this claim has an appearance of validity; hence, instead of disputing the point, I admit the article to the editorial column, and clear myself of responsibility by my argument in answer.

First, then, I deny that there is any inconsistency between my defence of my own position and my criticism of Mr. Yarros's. The reason why Mr. Yarros thinks that he sees an inconsistency here is found in his failure to perceive the whole of the difference between equal freedom posited as a law and equal freedom adopted as a generally trustworthy guiding principle of action, — between equal freedom obligatory upon man and regulative of his relations to nature and to his fellows prior to his consent and regardless of his will, and equal freedom voluntarily adopted by man in order that he may enjoy such relations to nature and his fellows as he deems needful or advantageous to himself. The difference between these two conceptions of equal freedom lies not simply in the fact that the latter admits a possibility of deviation which the former denies, but also in the fact that, while the latter asserts no other equality than that which men agree to observe for their own advantage in utter disregard of all theories of natural equality of rights, the former asserts an absolute natural equality of rights which all men are morally bound to observe, and which includes the equal right of all to the use of the earth. After this statement, which seems to me undeniable, it is needless to argue that the question of land tenure assumes a very different aspect in the one case from that which it wears in the other, and that the fact that I consider the occupancy-and-use rule perfectly harmonious with the one does not oblige me, as a matter of consistency, to consider it perfectly harmonious with the other. It may or may not be perfectly harmonious with the other, and the question whether it is or not depends upon the implications of the corollary which gives all men an equal right to the use of the earth.

From the paragraph just written it will be seen that equal freedom in the eyes of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Yarros is one thing, and that equal freedom in my eyes is quite a different thing. (Let it be noted, by the way, that this difference does not overturn the fact that the two views, for many practical purposes, amount to just the same thing, enabling Mr. Spencer, Mr. Yarros, and myself to work together for political ends that are in the main identical.) Then, going back of words to things, we find that Mr. Yarros's *real* attempt in his present article is to show consistency between occupancy-and-use as the rule of land tenure, which Liberty champions, and that view of equal freedom which Liberty antagonizes, and that therefore his article is not strictly within the line of Liberty's editorial policy, — in fact, is strictly without it, in view of my claim that these two *things* are essentially inconsistent. I emphasize *things* here, because Mr. Yarros seems to have fallen into the Spencerian vice of employing the same phrase (equal freedom) in different meanings and using them interchangeably in the development of logic and construction of syllogisms, making it necessary for the reader to remain upon his guard and carefully note in each case the idea behind the words.

Now we are ready to consider the implications of that corollary of Spencerian equal freedom which gives all men an equal right to the use of the earth. Mr. Yarros, in one part of his article, explicitly endorses the corollary as Spencer states it, — that all men "have equal rights to the use of this world." In another part of his article Mr. Yarros as explicitly "denies that equality in the use of the earth is a corollary from the law of equal freedom." It follows, of course, that to Mr. Yarros "equality in the use of the earth" is not the same thing as "equal rights to the use of this world." It is manifest that the discussion is now approaching a fine point, and I earnestly advise persons with weak eyes not to follow it further. Their power of vision might suffer a strain from which recovery would be impossible. But my own eyes are strong, and I can afford to abuse them a little. So here goes. Mr. Yarros "maintains that the law (or principle, if you prefer)" — here is an instance of his assumption that the two views of equal freedom are interchangeable — "of equal freedom does not *directly* point to *any* system of land tenure." And he proceeds to show this by proving very clearly that *my* formula, "equal freedom to control self and the results of self-exertion," "does not directly throw any light on the question of the use of the earth"; upon which point we are sure not to quarrel, my sole contention being that *Spencerian* equal freedom, while it does not indeed throw light, — for that which is itself darkness cannot throw light, — has nevertheless a direct bearing on the question of the use of the earth.

But further of that in a moment; I must stop to deal with an extremely *naïve* argument by which Mr. Yarros endeavors to show that my formula illuminates the land question *indirectly*. He tells us that the purpose of equal liberty, of freedom to control self and the results of self-exertion, is to secure the maximum of happiness for each individual, and that occupancy-and-use is the system of land tenure that answers this purpose most completely. I wish that some physicist would undertake to calculate the candle-power of this indirect illumination. But, as probably none will, let me attempt another manner of comparison. It will be admitted, I presume, that an authoritarian, an opponent of equal liberty, — a believer in the divine right of kings, for instance, — might be a champion of occupancy-and-use. Can we not fancy such a person using the following argument: "The purpose of authority is to secure the maximum of happiness for each individual, and I consider occupancy-and-use the system of land tenure that answers this purpose most completely. While authority does not directly throw any light on the question of the use of the earth, it does throw light on it indirectly, and I base my advocacy of occupancy-and-use on this indirect illumination"? It is clear that Mr. Yarros's argument and that of the hypothetical authoritarian are of exactly equal strength, and exactly cancel each other, showing that neither *my* liberty or authority throw the slightest light, directly or indirectly, on the question of the use of the earth.

Another point. To say that neither my equal liberty or Spencerian equal liberty — and be it remembered that Mr. Yarros allows no difference between them so far as the effect on the land question is concerned — directly throws any light on the question of the use of the earth is to declare that the doctrine of "equal rights to the use of this world," admittedly a direct corollary of Spencerian equal liberty, is absolutely meaningless. For, if it has any meaning at all, it must, to the extent of its meaning, directly bear on the land question. And, if it has no meaning whatever, then Mr. Yarros in the past has wasted much good ink in emphasizing a thing of no importance.

I contend that the doctrine of "equal rights to the use of this world" has a meaning, a very clear and indubitable meaning. Here we get to the kernel of the question; for Mr. Yarros, despite the inconsistency above noted, also maintains that it has a meaning, and the difference between us is as to what this meaning is. On this point it seems to me that Mr. Spencer and Mr. George are far more logical than Mr. Yarros. All three agree to this, — that "equal rights to the use of this world" means that "each man is free to use the earth for the satisfaction of his wants, provided he allows all others the same liberty." But Mr. Spencer and Mr. George maintain that all others have "the same liberty" only when all men are secured in the equal use of the entire earth. Mr. Yarros contends that all others have "the same liberty" when they are secured in the use of another portion of the earth than that in use by the single individual whom the word "each" here represents. That Mr. Yarros is wrong seems to me almost too plain for argument. If Smith has and exercises the liberty to use a piece of land which we will call A, Jones, in possessing the liberty to use another piece of land which we will call B, has not the same liberty that Smith has. Jones will have the same liberty that Smith has when he too has the liberty to use the land A. The liberty to use the land B is not the same, but another liberty. Two persons have not equal rights to the use of the world when one, by reason of prior arrival, may take his choice, and the other, who comes later, must take what is left. This may be seen more clearly still by assuming the theoretical, but not logically impossible, case in which every piece of the land composing the earth is in actual use at the time when an

additional person is born. There is no land left for the new-comer. Where, then, is his equal right to the use of the world? Could it be maintained that in a household the masters and servants enjoy equal rights to the use of the dinner when the servants must eat what is left after the masters have devoured the choice morsels? The fact that enough is left to satisfy the servants' hunger is not to the point when equality is under consideration. The servants have not equal rights with the masters until they too can have the choice morsels. But, it may be said, both cannot have the choice morsels. True enough; therefore equality is impossible, and any ethical system premising it is absurd. Spencer is entirely logical when he declares that his conception of equal freedom excludes property in land, and Mr. Yarros takes in reality no different position when he says that the only warrantable inference from equity is that "it does not permit some to appropriate the land to the exclusion of others." As if property in land were anything else than that! When one man appropriates a piece of land, he thereby excludes others from that piece of land; and yet Spencerian equal freedom puts all men on a par in their relation to precisely that piece of land, and I defy Mr. Yarros to prove the contrary. If natural equality of rights is a fundamental truth antedating land tenure and scientifically regulative of it, then the fact that one man has arbitrarily seized upon a piece of land cannot rightly deprive another man of the use thereof. There is no escaping the fact that "equal rights to the use of this world" means "equal rights of all men to the use of the entire world." The two phrases are virtually the same. There is scarcely a step from one to the other. Whoever accepts one must accept the other, and thereafter be logically debarred from favoring occupancy-and-use, which is an admission of inequality, as the rule of land tenure. I reiterate that Mr. Yarros, to be logical, must abandon either the occupancy-and-use doctrine or the Spencerian ethics.

Leaving now the land question, it remains only to consider Mr. Yarros's contention that it is never necessary to disregard equal freedom. I had instanced the case of a hostile army, composed in part of unwillingly conscripted men, marching on an Anarchistic community, rendering it necessary for the Anarchists in self-defence to kill the innocent with the invasive. Mr. Yarros answers that in this case there are no innocent; that the conscripted men commit an invasive act; that they have the liberty to die rather than march. Without stopping to insist upon the well-known propensity of the Moralist to prefer another's self-sacrifice to his own, or upon the awkward situation of the conscripted man, who must die if he does not march and who must die if he does, I will simply amend the illustration so as to leave no loophole by crawling through which Mr. Yarros can prolong the agony. Let us suppose, then, that a member of the hostile army takes one of the conscripted men by main force, leaving him no alternative whatsoever, and straps him in the basket of a balloon; that then he ascends in the balloon to a point above the Anarchistic community, and proceeds to rain down upon it dynamite bombs exploding from a fuse; and that it straightway becomes obvious that the only way by which the Anarchists can escape almost instant destruction is to riddle the balloon with bullets, thereby causing the man strapped in the basket to fall to the ground and suffer instant death. I am presuming, of course, that the Anarchists have previously been made aware of the exact situation. Now, in this case the man strapped in the balloon is not only innocent in intent, but non-invasive in act, for he commits no act whatsoever, the entire act being committed by the man who strapped him in the balloon. It is not even in his power to commit suicide. Is it not clear, then, that the Anarchists must either violate equal freedom by deliberately killing this non-invasive man, or must allow themselves to be wiped from the face of the earth? Take still another illustration. A fire starts at one end of a large city; a strong wind is blowing; the flames gain terrific headway, and sweep over acres of ground; the heat becomes so intense that the buildings, as fast as attacked, almost shrivel up and vanish; the conflagration is entirely beyond control; the whole city is threatened with destruction; there is but one way to save it, — namely, to doom a strip of territory stretching across the city at some distance from the flames and in their path, and to blow up with gunpowder all the houses thereon, thus creating a levelled surface across which the flames cannot leap; to this proposal the occupants of the doomed houses object; they say: "This fire cannot in any case do more than deprive us of our property; there is a chance that the wind may change, and our property thereby be saved; true, this chance is only one in a thousand, but, small as it is, we prefer to take it; we did not cause this fire; we are not invaders, and we insist that no one shall invade us." There is no denying that the blowing-up of these houses would be a violation of equal freedom. But I ask Mr. Yarros whether such circumstances would not make this violation a necessity. It seems to me that he must answer "Yes." But, if he makes this answer, he can no longer claim that equal freedom is a law. *Nous verrons.* T.

A Hard Road to Travel.

Mrs. Dietrick, in her letter on "The Road to Freedom" in another column, says that I have been unjust to her through failing to read recent numbers of the "Twentieth Century." The *fact* is that it was through reading recent numbers of the "Twentieth Century" that I came to make the remark of which she complains as unjust. She declares that, instead of persisting in proclaiming that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman, she has entirely ceased the statement, having made it for the last time in July, 1894.

Even if this were entirely true, it would not excuse Mrs. Dietrick. When one person makes an untrue statement about another, something more is incumbent upon him than the mere refraining from reiteration of it. Fairness requires him to retract it as publicly as he made it. And in the absence of such retraction he may fairly be regarded as adhering to it.

But it is distinctly not true that Mrs. Dietrick has ceased the statement in question. She has made it since last July. She made it no longer ago than last December, and in the "Twentieth Century." In that month and in that journal she used these words: "Liberty assuredly is prejudiced against women. On every other question Liberty champions the removal of restrictions." Now, no other interpretation can be put upon this language than that Liberty favors a freedom for men that it does not favor for women. And yet this language was used in comment upon a number of Liberty in which I made the express statement that "there is no freedom that I would grant to man which I would refuse to woman." Therefore I did no injustice to Mrs. Dietrick when I said that "she persists in falsely and inexcusably proclaiming in the 'Twentieth Century' that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman." On the contrary, she will remain guilty of injustice to me until she has made in the "Twentieth Century" a specific retraction of this charge. It is perfectly legitimate, however stupid, for Mrs. Dietrick to hold that Liberty denies liberty to both man and woman by endeavoring to prohibit both from using the ballot as a weapon of invasion. Ignorance of the meaning of the word liberty is admissible. But to say, hint, intimate, or imply that Liberty makes the smallest shade of discrimination between man and woman in the matter of any freedom whatsoever is a falsification of the facts for which, in Mrs. Dietrick's case, there is no excuse, even of ignorance and stupidity.

Now about the road to freedom. The first thing that one perceives about this highway as surveyed by Mrs. Dietrick is that she expects us to travel it in opposite directions at the same time, — a rather difficult feat even for men, to say nothing of women who have not learned to walk. The road runs between absolute authority and the largest possible equal freedom. We are now stationed at an intermediate point. Mrs. Dietrick would have us start directly for equal freedom by dividing power, which would lessen tyranny; and at the same time she would have us start for absolute authority by further invasive legislation, which would increase tyranny, — her idea in the latter case being to arrive at the goal of authority so forcibly as to rebound to the goal of equal freedom. *Theoretically* her proposal is of this double character, and I oppose it as obviously inconsistent and impracticable.

Practically, however, the charge of inconsistency does not hold, because *practically* Mrs. Dietrick does not propose a division of power. I willingly admit that real division of power would lessen tyranny; and, while I would take no part in politics to effect it, I would watch with glee any movement in that direction, and would chuckle over its success. At present much of our comparative safety lies in the division of power that already exists. The United States government fortunately so far violates the pure representative principle that it has two houses of legislation (instead of one) which check each other, and both of which are further checked in their legislative function by the veto power of the executive on the one hand and of the judiciary on the other. The effect of this is unquestionably to impede legislation. I would like to see these checks multiplied indefinitely. A sufficient number of them would absolutely kill government. But does Mrs. Dietrick propose any additional check? Not the smallest. To give woman the ballot is not to further

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As It Appears in a Dream.

One of those strange, but convenient, dreams the privileged few experience in these *fin de siècle* days came to me recently. I thought I was standing in front of a huge machine of a queer shape and with dark, indefinable outlines. There seemed to be many divisions within, and a wondrous array of wheels, pulleys, cogs, and belts; and I was impressed with the idea that marvellous things could be done through it by touching a button or pulling a stop. I noticed presently that a particular set of pompous-looking men seemed to have control of the buttons and stops, and some of their number were constantly turning a crank that controlled the power which ran the machine. Back of these men another set of individuals were grouped, who gazed eagerly and watchfully on, but with a certain air of comradeship, as though they were quite confident nothing so very far out of the way would be done by the fellows at the buttons, — at least nothing detrimental to interests which were mutual. On a lower plane were collected an earnest-looking group of men, with lean and longing faces and fingers nervously moving, as though tingling to get within reach of the wonderful machine. In the eyes of many of them a lofty purpose shone; some of them had hard hands and bent shoulders; but a great many only looked yearningly at that which was got out of the machine by luckier men.

On a platform, decked and gilded, moved about many proud and satisfied-appearing people. I noticed that they often resorted to the machine, which seemed amply fitted to supply their wants. One would approach some one in control of the buttons and stops and confer with him awhile; the keys would be manipulated, the wheels would turn, a creak and a groan sound from somewhere beneath, and presently out would drop a railroad or a bank. The manipulator would receive his share, and the interested party would pick up his property and complacently walk off with it. I saw many valuable pieces of property squeezed out of interstices of the great instrument in the same way. And presently I saw that at many trough-like openings steady streams of gold were pouring out, which the occupants of the platform caught in bags and carried away.

Then I began to be curious about the rest of the machine. It seemed to reach down, down into a sort of indefinite duskiness, and I climbed down something dark and vague, until I could look beneath it. It was black and gloomy there, and I could not at first make out what it was that supported the machine; something seemed to be moving under it. As my eyes became accustomed to the gloom, I saw that there were innumerable human beings beneath it, and upon their backs and bent shoulders the huge, heavy monster rested. Women helped bear the burden, and even upon the heads of little children it pressed heavily. And while the great weight was patiently borne, they all seemed to be active. Some were digging, some were dragging out from curious depths, great piles of useful material. Some were constructing, putting together, innumerable articles whose nature I could not understand. All were straining, tugging, pulling, dragging, pushing with anxious energy, and apparently struggling with each other for a *place* beneath the great machine.

As I gazed wonderingly, I noticed that little hooks and scoops reached down here and there, and picked up the materials which the straining people seemed to be struggling over; so that, hard as they toiled to get a quantity of their productions together, nearly all would disappear, and the poor workers seemed not to know what became of it. I had some strange power of watching the course of the materials as they were taken up into the machine. They were whirled through many compartments and manipulated by many wheels, and finally turned into the steady streams of gold, or into titles, and bonds and stocks and wheat options, and poured out of the openings at the top for the benefit of the platform people. The machine was a marvellous, a most ingenious contrivance, and it did its work miraculously well.

But it had another use I saw, at last. Sometimes some of the beings beneath would be crowded outside; sometimes they fell down in the struggle; sometimes they deliberately lay down, refusing thus to bear their share of the burden. But generally, when this happened, they would be rolled toward a great mouth that swallowed them up. From there they would be flung into presses, and every atom of that material that could be turned into gold squeezed out of them. Then they would be whirled and tossed about by the complicated wheels, and bruised and beaten until at last they would be cast out, — a lot of refuse on the far side of the machine. Some of these were dead, with the marks of the machine in the shape of a black line around their necks or the scar of an electrical burn upon their bodies; some still lived, but pale and emaciated, with an everlasting sign of ruin about them; some crawled out of sight; all were miserable, useless wrecks.

The group of men above who worked the stops of this part of the machine looked calm, dignified, and complacent. As the squeezed victims passed through, it often seemed to rest with them whether they should go any further or not. Generally they decided by a guess,* and if such a guess sent the victims on through the whole course of wheels and presses to be cast out dead or a ruin at last, it hindered not their placid enjoyment of the good things of the upper platform. Sometimes an interesting case would pass before them. If the victim had about him a considerable portion of the material out of which gold is made, and did not conceal his contempt for his persecutors, he would be tossed and banded about among the lighter wheels indefinitely, to their own satisfaction and the good of the streams of gold; they cared not what was the effect on the victim. But what gave them peculiar satisfaction was to get hold of an objector, — some one who would not keep still about such arrangements. Then were the screws tightened, the wheels turned faster, the whole machine set flying at its best. Then the victims found what tragedy lay in the fate that could be ground out for them.

Somehow I got down among the poor creatures who supported the Thing on their backs. I saw that many of them loved the huge burden upon them. They did not comprehend what it was; they did not know that its weight was wearing them out as they struggled; they thought it sheltered and protected them; and in their leisure moments they went through various strange antics in order to show their reverence for it. They would wave bright-colored rags in its honor, and shout and halloa in its name, and trudge about in queer evolutions, believing that in some manner the Thing was benefited and pleased.

But there were others among them who admitted that the Thing bore heavily upon them in places; that it *did* hurt sometimes, and it did grab up an awful lot of the wealth they created underneath it. "But that was because it wasn't managed right," they said. "If only they would all move together and shift it a little from one side to the other, it wouldn't seem so heavy, they were sure; or, if some of them could climb up among the cogs and wheels and arrange them differently, take out a few and replace them with smoother and better ones, or if some few of their number could get outside and get at the crank and turn it in a different way, the machine would be lighter, run more smoothly, and there would not be so many scoops running down to grab up everything they could get together."

But presently I saw a few serious-looking people peering searchingly into the works, and suggesting that the machine itself might be of no use whatever to any of them; that the best thing that could be done with it was to heave altogether and throw it off their backs. It certainly did not furnish them with any of the material they lived upon or worked with; they dug that out of the ground at their feet. It really seemed to serve no good purpose as far as they were concerned, and without it they could stand upright and work freely and easily. A cry of dismay went up from the others. "Why, we could not get along without it," they exclaimed. "It shelters and protects us. We could not even work without its wonderful existence over us! We must have *something* there! If you could manage to destroy it, what in heaven's name would you put in its place?" And they looked at each other with an air of having clinched the argument.

But the serious people kept on quietly arguing that nothing *was* needed; that freedom, light, space were all they *wanted* to grow strong and perfect and happy. Some of these were so zealous as to advocate destroying the Thing with a new explosive chemical they had discovered. There were others who exclaimed: "The Thing is rotting away of itself. It will soon fall to pieces of its own enormous weight and corruption. We can do nothing to hasten it."

But others, anxious and sympathetic, cried: "The people cannot wait! They are suffering. Something must be done, and that very soon. If we cannot do what we would like to do, let us do what we can to alleviate the people's distress!" And a few more quietly persisted that, if they would keep on talking until most of the people understood, it could be easily thrown off, for it was a creature of superstitious imagination, after all. In great suspense I listened for the outcome of the discussion. But I do not know how they settled it, since suddenly the dream ended,— the whole dark scene disappeared.

LIZZIE M. HOLMES.

* Judge Gary, on having some of his decisions reversed by a superior court, said: "Oh, well, they had the last 'guess,'—that is all."

The Road to Freedom.

To the Editor of Liberty:

If you will kindly glance over the columns of the late numbers of the "Twentieth Century," you will discover that you are unjust to me. You say that I "persist in falsely and inexcusably proclaiming in the 'Twentieth Century' that Liberty is opposed to the liberty of woman."

This is an error. I do not "persist." On the contrary, I have entirely ceased the statement that I did make, which was that Liberty seemed to argue as follows: "Every individual should be as free from coercion and interference as possible; therefore, all women should be deprived of even the degree of freedom men now enjoy" (see "Twentieth Century," July 12, page 13).

Liberty will doubtless admit that the men who are legally accorded freedom to make laws both for themselves and for women have more liberty than the women who are required to obey, without legal power even to debate or to protest against those laws as they arise in the legislature. I believe in decreasing laws, and in increasing self-help and self-dependence. But I believe such result must come as an evolutionary process, through wide division of power. There is far less tyranny in families since millions of women have refused to take the vow of obedience to a husband. Children have vastly more liberty since two sovereigns have divided the power over children once held by one despot.

Judging from all past experience of division of power, I conclude that the mere division acts as a solvent of tyranny. If women entered legislatures, determined to tyrannize over men's tastes, all that would be needed would be for men to retort in kind. A feminine bill to prohibit liquor-drinking could be rendered ridiculous by a masculine bill to prohibit tea- and coffee-drinking. History would show that philosophers once attributed all the wretched poverty of eighteenth-century England to tea-drinking! A feminine bill to protect women of tender age from the wiles of men could be offset by a masculine bill to deliver soft-hearted men from the designing allurements of women; a bill against cigarettes by a bill against corsets; and so on. A season or two of such contra-legislation ought to go farther to teach a practical lesson in the benefits of liberty than a decade of pure theorizing. I may be wrong. I am quite open to conviction. I have no belief, whatever, in the efficacy of human laws to do good. With Herbert Spencer, I consider law-making a pernicious business. I also consider falling down stairs, tumbling out of trees, burning one's self, or cutting one's self with scissors or knives, as purely injurious. But, although I used my utmost powers of persuasion, I was wholly unable to induce my infant daughters to accept my convictions on these points. As a philosopher, I warned them of the evil consequences to themselves of the reckless use of their untried powers. They heard, but did not heed, me. One touch of a hot lamp-chimney, one tumble down stairs, one gash of a knife, was more effectual in adding to their own wisdom than twenty years of theorizing. Now, the vast majority of women of the United States today are as tenaciously sure that human laws can work social miracles as my babies were tenaciously sure that they could go down stairs safely before they had learned

how. This vast majority will be deaf to Liberty's arguments until after they, themselves, have tried, at least, a measure of legislating, and have experimentally seen the folly of it.

A hundred years ago the liberty theorists tried to establish human freedom from every sort of tyranny. The preamble — the corner-stone — of the constitution of Massachusetts is a declaration of pure Anarchy, of perfect individual self-government, allowing no law to be made without the consent of *each citizen*. Think of that!

But the poor things had had no experience whatever in self-government. They were (as women now are) saturated with slavish reverence for whatever successfully posed as having divine authority, with reverence for law-making bodies, with reverence for police force and jails and penalties and all sorts of terrors. Their sublime theories didn't do them a bit of good. They didn't even comprehend what they were saying, as the balance of their constitution shows. It is the most incongruous piece of old patchwork possible to imagine, and they made it still more ridiculously incongruous, in 1820, by putting in an amendment which converted the male people into legal sovereigns over the female people! Today a few men in Massachusetts have learned something by the past hundred years' experience. These cannot look each other in the face without laughing, as they hear the gullible populace clamoring for relief from their sufferings by process of legislation.

But the female people of Massachusetts are as experimentally ignorant of the limitations of law-making as were the male people a hundred years ago. More men than women are ready for true and righteous freedom, simply because men, as a whole, have had more liberty to experiment and have thus learned the viciousness of legislators' laws. I claim that, whether we will or no, the next step for women must be the measure of liberty represented by possession and use of the ballot. Millions of them are terribly afraid to have even that measure of liberty given to them. They are like children, whose spirit has been broken by long imprisonment, and who have been alternately coddled and frightened by ignorant nurses and guardians, until their minds are weakened and their liberty-loving spirit atrophied. They will have to be dealt with accordingly. They can be coaxed to consider the use of the ballot a right, duty, and privilege. The mere division of legal power between the sexes must, inevitably, weaken power. The use of the ballot will educate them, as it has already educated many men, in knowledge of the imperfections of human governments, and thus gradually prepare them for the abolishment of president, lawyers, governors, and legislatures.

So long as they are afraid of even nominal self-government, it is absolutely useless to talk to them of real, true self-government. And, mark my words, there will never be permanent freedom for the world until the mothers of the world have learned to know, to respect, and to thoroughly put their trust in, freedom. There is a gulf to be crossed before that state is reached. Liberty would seem to advise a flying leap for those who have not yet learned to walk. I advise the use of the present foot-bridge, imperfect though it be.

ELLEN BATTELLE DIETRICK.

Government and Banking.

To the Editor of Liberty:

You wish to know what function I wish the government to perform in the matter of banking. The answer is virtually contained in my preceding communication. I desire the government to repeal all laws inconsistent with equal freedom. Some functions, I think, should properly be retained by the government. Considering that in an ideal state of society laws are nothing more than mutual agreements, the government should by all means define the word "dollar," — *i. e.*, make a definite amount of a definite commodity legal tender. When credit money in the form of promises is issued by any private association, it should, in the event of the failure of the issuer, enforce this promise, if possible. It is therefore proper that the government shall insist upon reasonable measures that will render such enforcement least costly. Moreover, the people have a right to refuse to accept notes in circulation, unless assurance of the solvency and good faith of the issuer is given; and so long as the government is the people's attorney, the people will naturally appoint that organization to receive and control the securities offered by the issuers.

The logical outcome of a system of free, mutual banking will be the consolidation of all banks of a country into one national organization; hence I think that working at once for such is by far the shortest way to the goal. I would therefore endorse all laws consistent with the rules which a mutual bank must make to be successful, and I think the brief outline indicated in "A Study of the Money Question" is to the point. You will please remember that the book was written principally for conservative readers. Had it been intended for radicals, I should have worded it differently. If in any particular my proposition is not consistent with the above principle, I am ready to amend; but as yet I have seen no valid objection.

HUGO BILGRAM.

The Game Question.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Mr. Lloyd thinks my argument against his views as expressed in "Game and Forests" was not nearly as strong as it might have been; to which I reply: I think so too. I did not deem the subject of sufficient importance to require an exhaustive treatise, and my time was limited.

As to food, — I also said "source," not supply. It would seem that Mr. Lloyd uses the word in a sense different from that in which I use it. I do not consider it proper to say that the source is now great, for its present ability to supply food is very limited, except in the form of fish. True enough, if this wild game were cared for and protected in accordance with his plan, it "might afford a really great supply of food," and I think it is equally true, as I said before in substance, that this source of food *is now very nearly cut off*. But, being a vegetarian, I am not worried on that account.

Mr. Lloyd seems to think I am a sentimentalist, but I beg to assure him that such is not the case, — at least not as regards the subject under discussion. When "Brer Rabbit" becomes my enemy, I treat him accordingly. When the existence of any of the lower animals comes in conflict with what seem to be my best interests, I will employ the most effective means of extermination that is practicable. I would not take pleasure in the killing, but could do it if the occasion required.

I am unable to see how Mr. Lloyd arrives at the conclusion that, under the plan he proposes, the individuals of various tastes and inclinations "would each have more equal freedom than by adopting any non sportsman's view." I distinctly stated in my former article that I would not think of preventing others from following their natural bent so long as they did not commit trespass. If, under Anarchy, these people of various tastes adopt the "non-sportsman's view," it must be assumed that their choice is voluntary, and therefore it is nonsense to say they "would have more equal freedom," or "each come nearer to realizing his ideals" in some other way. If the sportsman and the flesh-eater voluntarily adopt the views of the non-sportsman and vegetarian, it follows that their ideals have changed.

It is possible that I misunderstood Mr. Lloyd's use of the words "cost" and "profitable" in the paragraph previously criticised, and I am well aware that the word "profitable" is often used to mean something else than "gain over expenditure"; but I am yet unable to find anything in the article, "Game and Forests," to indicate that the word was not there used in the commercial sense; and, until Mr. Lloyd points out something to show the contrary, I must insist that the construction I placed on the word was entirely warranted.

I understand that "it is the province of Anarchistic juries to consider all questions of invasion and damages," but I do *not* understand that Anarchism contemplates the assessment of damages against one who injures the business of another so long as he confines himself to non-invasive methods.

I am still unable to see that the fishermen in Mr. Lloyd's illustration can rightfully collect damages. Surely they could not maintain a property right over public waters. Can they, then, maintain a property right over the fish that live in said waters, previous to having caught the fish? If so, on what grounds? If the fishermen cannot maintain a property right either over the water or the fish living therein, why should they get damages for the destruction of the fish?

If the water supply of a city was poisoned, I should consider it cause for restraint.

I also think that "equal freedom fits everywhere," but it would seem that I cannot agree with Mr. Lloyd as to what constitutes equal freedom; for I deny that "each has a right to pursue his own business without being needlessly injured by the other." I believe in the boycott and perfect freedom in competition. Both of these may needlessly injure the business of people, no matter what their occupation; and a literal construction of the above statement will rule them both out.

Concerning the use of seines and dynamite, I would suggest that, if there are enough fish to be caught with hook and line to supply the market, the same market can be supplied with much less labor by the use of wholesale methods of fishing. And, as the fishermen would have no object in catching fish they could not sell, I do not see that the fish would be in greater danger of extermination because that method was adopted. It would merely be the employment of the most effective means to accomplish the object desired. I see no occasion for the boycott here; but, if an occasion arose that called for it, it could, and no doubt would, be applied.

As to Mr. Lloyd's conviction "that men 'are that kind of animals' which know how to defend themselves," I again fail to agree. I hope they will learn some time, but at present the majority of men do not give any very convincing evidence of having mastered that lesson.

Much more might be said, but, as I do not wish to extend the controversy unnecessarily, I will also leave this article open to the charge of incompleteness.

F. E. LEONARD.

Moralism.

To the Editor of Liberty:

I do not dispute your right to quote Kant as a Moralist, but I protest against the idea that one must agree with Kant in order to be a Moralist. I have always supposed that the teachings of the New Testament were Moralistically orthodox; and there it says (among many similar passages): "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law. — Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: love therefore is the fulfilment of the law." This certainly recognizes a "law" to which our conduct should conform, whether we are inclined to it or not. But at the same time it declares, if one's inclinations lead him to do what the law prescribes, he is fulfilling the law in the highest sense — in a way worthy of special praise — by following his inclinations. If Moralism is to be so defined that it will not allow an act to be moral unless contrary to what would otherwise be inclination, then I do not know that I ever met anyone who was a Moralist either in profession, in belief, or in practice, though I have heard of plenty of them.

As to Egoism, the only Egoism I can understand is that which says with Badcock, "What another does is beyond my praise or blame," and with Stirner, "I am neither good or bad. Both have no meaning for me." When one declares that a certain line of action is admirable and a certain other line despicable, he is making actions out to be desirable or undesirable by reason of some inherent goodness or badness in the action itself. And this is Moralism as it ordinarily lives and works, if not as it may have been defined by crotchety philosophers.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.

Slavery by Consent.

[John Badcock, Jr., in "Slaves to Duty."]

The believer in *duty* is food for powder. He will either be enslaved by the crafty, or by what he calls his "conscience." His freedom is a limited freedom at best. Circumstances change, but he dare not take advantage of the tide which, taken at the flood, would have led him on to fortune and pleasures new. The propitious time, when tabooed pleasures offer themselves to him, he is afraid of. His duty to Mrs. Grundy, or Mrs. Jones, to the dead hand, to his religion or to a principle, binds him. He lives within boundary walls which he dare not scale.

A Hard Road to Travel.

[Continued from page 5.]

divide power. When the woman-suffrage movement shall take the shape of a movement for the creation of a third legislative house (composed entirely of women, or composed otherwise; elected entirely by women, or elected otherwise; about these particulars I care not), clothed with powers like to those of each of the other houses, so that any measure, to become a law, must pass three houses instead of two, it will be met by me with no opposition, with no declaration that it would lessen liberty; for I think that it would hinder the growth of tyrannical legislation. But the woman-suffrage movement proposes no such thing. It simply proposes to increase the number of electors by adding to it an immense mass of persons who, on an average, are even more disposed to tyranny than those who now exercise the electoral function. The added mass is not to be given an independent power; it is not to be allowed to check the original mass; all matters are to be decided by a single majority vote, as at present.

Mrs. Dietrick's instance of the family is to my purpose as an illustration. Division of parental authority between father and mother has undoubtedly made children freer. But suppose a family having ten fathers and ten mothers (the impossibility of the hypothesis does not lessen the virtue of the illustration). If a law for the government of the children had to receive the votes of at least six of the ten fathers and in addition the votes of at least six of the ten mothers; and if this law had to receive the votes of at least six of the ten mothers even though it received the votes of all ten of the fathers, and *vice versa*, — then the children would be freer than if they were to be governed by laws needing only the votes of six of the ten fathers. And this would remain true even if the mothers were more tyrannical by nature than the fathers. But, if the laws governing the children were to be enacted by the votes of eleven of the entire twenty parents, whether fathers or mothers, the children would be no freer than under laws enacted by the votes of six of the ten fathers; and, if the mothers were more tyrannical by nature than the fathers, the children would be even less free under such an arrangement. In the first case there is real division of power; in the second there is no division of power at all, but only an increase in the number of voters.

The illustration thus drawn from the family applies perfectly to the State. If women were to enter the legislatures, the corset bill would not kill the cigarette bill, but both would be passed instead of one. There would be no division of power, and hence no consequent lessening of tyranny. Mrs. Dietrick's real proposition, then, is to travel the road only in one direction, — toward absolute authority.

Let us increase tyranny, she says; let us make more laws and worse laws; we shall get sick of them, and then resort to equal freedom. Yes, if we are not killed or hopelessly crippled in the experiment. Here the analogy between the family and the State is less perfect. Mrs. Dietrick perhaps allowed her daughter to pass her hand through a gas jet, but I fancy she did not encourage her to take a seat upon a red-hot stove. In other words, she followed the good rule that it is wise to allow an infant to experiment within limits perfectly under the parent's control. But the voter has no such control over himself, over his fellows, or over the State. Conditions are more complex than in the family; effects are more remote from causes; all feel the pain, but few know whence it comes; the mass rush farther into the flames, thinking that in their flight safety lies; and the result is disaster, perhaps irretrievable. It is a dangerous road over which Mrs. Dietrick would escort us; it is the road that leads sooner or later to revolution and violence; there will be cataclysmal accidents before the journey's end. No, Mrs. Dietrick; for one, I will not follow you; though I go alone, I will steer my course direct for equal freedom. But, if you are earnest in what you say, you will remain no mere woman-suffrage advocate. Your place is in the State Socialistic party. If you really wish to carry tyranny to its ultimate, the followers of Karl Marx are waiting for your aid. You have no business to preach equal freedom. You ought to be urging all people, men and women alike, and especially the uneducated, to commit every species of invasion — for educational purposes. Pursue your foolhardy policy. Take the risk, if you choose. But are you prepared to take also the fearful responsibility?

For my part, I have not your temerity. I prefer other methods of education, — quieter, slower, safer, surer. And I believe that even women and mothers can be educated better, and are being educated better, into a knowledge of and trust in freedom, by enlisting them in movements that rely upon freedom for the solution of social questions than by inviting them to wield a weapon of invasion in a riot of authoritarian madness. T.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, Bordentown, N. J.

One writes that he and others would join the Corps, but that they "consider that first-class and thoroughly *scientific* work is the only kind of work that commands respect and success." There are two fallacies there. First, the statement is false. Stupid charlatanry commands respect and success every day by sheer loudness of shouting; and I cannot see why Anarchists should not shout as loud as they can, and get their share of the fruits of this illogical, but powerful, method of propaganda.

Stripped of figurative language, and applied to the A. L. W. C., that means that there is a power in mere brute numbers, and that a number of second-rate letters will often get an amount of attention, and produce an effect, that could not have been expected from a single first-rate letter. And this is specially true in work for a cause whose main weakness is its utter novelty and the fewness of its supporters; for the receipt of several successive letters in the same line will do something to wear away the strangeness which is our disadvantage.

The second fallacy is the implication that ordinary people cannot do thoroughly scientific work. A plain statement of truth, whether abstruse or elementary, is always thoroughly scientific; and an ordinary man can, after a little practice, make a plain statement of such truth as is familiar to him. Most of those with whom our corps has to deal need only elementary truth. Anything that is too difficult for an average Anarchist to discuss freely will be too difficult for the average Archist to comprehend, and ought not to be brought into a propaganda letter.

Most of the effects produced in the world are produced by second rate men. It always has been so, and probably always will be. What folly, then, for one to expect that his work will not be effective because he is a second rate man!

The editor of the "Union," target of Section B on Jan. 26, writes to complain that Section B has sent him no letters on money. As they may have written on other subjects, I do not feel it necessary to think that any of the members were delinquent. But the interesting thing is that one of the members of Section B did write him a letter on money, and sent me a copy to get my opinion of it. I wrote back that it was all right, but he might better have spent less space in pointing out the importance of the money question and more in pointing out its solution. Now it appears that there was so little Anarchistic matter in that letter that the recipient, watching for Anarchist letters, failed to recognize it as such.

I think I have said before, and I want to keep saying it till I make people believe it, that space used in pointing out the importance of economic problems or the evils of private monopoly is generally space wasted, as far as we are concerned. Everybody knows those things already; if not, he will hear them within a week without our help. The Populists are saying these things for us; our business is to say the things that nobody else will say for us. There is no Anarchist propaganda at all in telling anybody that we need a change; the thing to do is to tell what change we need, — not only what we ought to change *from*, but what we ought to change *to*.

Suggestions for letters to persons who are not editors:

Sign full name and date with full address, as advised last week. Show the bearing of Anarchism on what you suppose the man to be specially interested in. Recommend to him our best literature. Enclose any tracts, clippings, etc., that you think would make a favorable impression.

Target, section A. — "The Union," 323 Nicollet Ave., room 59, Palace block, Minneapolis, Minn., wants letters on money for the editor of the first page. The editor has specially asked me for letters on *mutual banking*.

Section B. — "The South-West," Carlisle building, 51 W. 4th street, Cincinnati, Ohio, Democratic and individualist journal, especially opposed to prohibition, printed the following in its issue of March 8:

> Some time in the Long Ago, in the country of Somewhere, there was a fundamental law which provided that no member of any law-making body should offer a bill for a new law without a rope about his neck in order that, should the measure fail which he had proposed, he might be instantly swung into eternity. As a result of this beneficial provision, no new law was enacted for a thousand years, and the people were contented, happy, and prosperous. What a pity some such law is not in force in this country.—*Ohio Patriot*.

What might not the 53d, and the 52d, the 51st, the 50th, and all the other congresses, have accomplished with such a law as this. A prominent business man was heard to say the other day: "There is nothing so good for the country as when the time comes for the congresses or the legislatures or any of the rest of them to pack up their grips and quit." And he is not alone in his thoughts. There are others, — oh, so many others! — who will say Amen to this.

Press home the argument for the abolition of all government in the sense of invasion. I should like to see one of the samples which will probably be sent to any one whose letter is printed.

Section C. — Henry Cohen, 1239 Welton street, Denver, Col. Send him letters for labor papers, as directed in No. 309. Note also what I said above about the need of telling what ought to be done, and the uselessness of talking about the great evil of our present condition, etc. If indefinite general denunciations of monopoly are needless and useless anywhere, it is in a labor paper.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.